The three-day visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Riyadh demonstrates the ever-increasing significance of Sino-Saudi relations and sends a clear message from Saudi Arabia that it will not submit to American dictates.
Xi’s first excursion to Saudi Arabia in quite a while gives Saudi Crown Ruler and Top state leader Mohammed canister Salman (MBS) a more prominent chance to declare his effect on the worldwide stage as an undeniably significant figure in worldwide issues.
The majority of this week’s meetings will be devoted to discussing the economic aspects of the Sino-Saudi partnership. The Saudi Press Agency (SPA) reports that the kingdom and China will conclude agreements worth $29.6 billion. These agreements will strengthen the already strong trade, business, and investment ties that exist between the two nations.
China is Saudi Arabia’s top raw petroleum market, representing in excess of 25% of all Saudi raw petroleum trades in 2021. In an interview with Al Jazeera, the director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute, John Calabrese, stated that these export revenues assist the Saudi government in maintaining its “social bargain.”
In addition, these earnings are crucial to Saudi Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia’s ambitious plan for economic diversification, particularly in relation to the upcoming futuristic city of Neom.
Saudi Arabia can anticipate that its collaboration with the Chinese will continue to grow in a variety of ways if the smart city is successful. This is especially true in light of the possibility that a lot of Chinese tourists will visit Saudi resorts on the Red Sea.
“Saudi Arabia is joining forces with China to speed up the realm’s digitalization of the energy area and the advanced change of the economy all the more comprehensively,” noticed Calabrese. ” Saudi Aramco, a petroleum and natural gas company, is looking to expand its downstream activities in Asia and sees China as an important investment destination. The development of renewables and hydrogen cooperation is still in its infancy but could blossom.
From Beijing’s perspective, Saudi Arabia is a significant energy source that has a significant impact on China’s economic growth in the future.
Al Jazeera was informed by Dave DesRoches, an assistant professor at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, that “the Chinese need to know that Riyadh can remain a reliable producer.” Particularly now that people are becoming more concerned about Iran’s weapons exports to Russia, it appears that Iran, which Beijing has been relying on for a lot of its oil, may be reducing its export capabilities.
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US concerns
There are indications that the bilateral partnership is growing and taking on more security-related facets.
The majority of the ties that exist between Saudi Arabia and China are based on business. However, Jonathan Panikoff, director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Program, told Al Jazeera that many global relationships and alliances, both bilateral and multilateral, began this way and then expanded to other realms, including traditional defense areas.
As an illustration, CNN reported a year ago that Beijing was supporting Saudi Arabia’s efforts to produce its own ballistic missiles. Likewise, in specific specialty regions, for example, equipped robots, the Chinese have made deals with Saudi Arabia’s weapons advancement, filling holes that the US has decided not to fill for Riyadh.
The defense and security aspects of the Sino-Saudi relationship are a major source of Washington’s concern. According to Panikoff, “the challenge for the US in relation to the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia is that Beijing is simply easier to work with from the perspective of Riyadh.” It doesn’t impose burdensome end-user restrictions on military hardware, views China as politically consistent, and doesn’t lecture Riyadh about human rights.
Despite this, China is not even close to taking over Saudi Arabia’s defense guarantee from the United States. Beijing has not indicated that it may or may attempt to do so in the near future.
In an interview with Al Jazeera, former US ambassador to Tunisia Gordon Gray stated, “Since the Saudi military relies so heavily on US assistance, training, and spare parts, it would be self-defeating for the Saudis to look to China to replace the United States in this field.”
DesRoches stated, “China is not really a security partner for the Middle East.” Even though the Chinese have increased the size of their armed forces and established a base in Djibouti, as well as covert bases in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates, “they really don’t have the ability to project force in a decisive and timely manner to defend the integrity of the Saudi state like the US did in Operation Desert Storm.”
According to Gray, “US military assets in the Gulf would help defend Saudi Arabia if its nightmare scenario, a conventional attack from Iran, occurs; The first phone call from Saudi Arabia would be to CENTCOM, not Beijing.
At this crossroads, there is not obvious explanation to anticipate that the Chinese should before long lay out any army installation on Saudi soil. However, Panikoff suggested that “we shouldn’t be as dismissive of that possibility in the coming decades as many seem to be” and that this could change in the coming years.
The depth of the Sino-Saudi security partnership should not be overstated, at least for the time being. However, Riyadh appears primarily determined to present its defense cooperation with Beijing as significantly more extensive than it actually is. This is primarily an effort by Riyadh to increase its influence with Washington officials and to remind the Americans that the kingdom has other powerful allies it can rely on in a world that is becoming increasingly multipolar.
Reaction from Team Biden
The Saudis’ lavish reception of the Chinese leader in Riyadh does not satisfy Washington’s establishment of foreign policy. US officials are aware of the difference between the visits of the American and Chinese presidents, despite Biden’s relatively low-key reception in Jeddah five months ago.
Regardless, the Biden organization responding too adversely or freely to Saudi Arabia’s choice to have Xi could misfire against US interests.
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The White House “definitely should try not to cause any more open to noticing the visit than it has or will guarantee”, said Calabrese. ” Hype about the “China threat” and public pressure on Saudi Arabia or any other Gulf nation could backfire. A more selective approach through quiet diplomacy is likely to be more effective than a blunt-edged public admonition if the visit yields concrete results.
SOURCE: AL JAZEERA