For the past 25 years, Somalia’s political transitions have not succeeded by accident. They were sustained through international engagement, pressure, and mediation aimed at preserving fragile political settlements. Today, however, Somalia stands at a dangerous crossroads. The federal government’s unilateral pursuit of power, cloaked in the language of democratic reform, threatens to trigger a legitimacy crisis and undo decades of political gains and international investment.
Universal suffrage is an ideal that all Somalis share. However, deep political disagreement among groups, persistent security challenges, the looming expiry of the government’s mandate, and financial constraints make the timely implementation of universal suffrage nearly impossible.
Pursuing universal suffrage without political consent, institutional readiness, or minimum security guarantees does not deepen democracy or sovereignty; it concentrates power in the hands of incumbents while increasing the risk of fragmentation and parallel authority.
Instead of addressing these constraints through consensus, the government is engaged in a power grab, deploying the rhetoric of universal suffrage. It has unilaterally changed the constitution, which forms the basis of the political settlement. It has also enacted self-serving laws governing electoral processes, political parties, and the Election and Boundaries Commission. Moreover, the government has appointed 18 commissioners, all backed by the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP).
Meanwhile, Somaliland announced its secession in 1991 and has been seeking recognition for the last three and a half decades. Most of Somalia’s national opposition, along with the leaders of Puntland and Jubbaland Federal Member States, have rejected the government’s approach and formed the Council for the Future of Somalia. These groups have announced plans to organise a political convention in Somalia, signalling their intent to pursue a parallel political process if the government does not listen.
The Federal Government of Somalia does not fully control the country. Al-Shabab controls certain regions and districts and retains the ability to conduct operations well beyond its areas of direct control. Recently, the hardline group attacked a prison located near Villa Somalia, a stark reminder of the fragile security environment in which any electoral process would have to take place.
Given the extent of polarisation and the limited time remaining under the current mandate, the international community must intervene to support Somalia’s sixth political transition in 2026. The most viable way to ensure a safe transition is to promote an improved indirect election model. Somalia’s political class has long experience with indirect elections, having relied on this model five times over the past 25 years. However, even with political agreement, the improved indirect election model for the 2026 dispensation must meet standards of timeliness, feasibility, competitiveness, and inclusivity.
The current government mandate expires on May 15, 2026, and discussions are already under way among government supporters about a unilateral term extension. This must be discouraged. If a political agreement is reached in time, some form of technical extension may be necessary, but this should only occur while the 2026 selection and election processes are actively under way. One way to avoid this recurring crisis would be to establish a firm and binding deadline for elections. Puntland, for example, has maintained a schedule of elections held every five years in January.
The improved indirect election model must also be feasible, meaning it should be straightforward to understand and implement. Political groups could agree on a fixed number of delegates to elect each seat. Recognised traditional elders from each constituency would then select delegates. Delegates from a small cluster of constituencies would collaborate to elect candidates for those seats. This system is far from ideal, but it is workable under current conditions.
Unlike previous attempts, the improved indirect election model must also be genuinely competitive and inclusive. In past elections, politicians manipulated parliamentary selection by restricting competition through a practice known as “Malxiis” (bestman). The preferred candidate introduces a bestman, someone who pretends to compete but is never intended to win. For the upcoming election, the process must allow candidates to compete meaningfully rather than symbolically. A clear threshold of “no manipulation” and “no bestman” must be enforced.
Inclusivity remains another major concern. Women’s seats, which should account for about 30 percent of parliament, have frequently been undermined. Any political agreement must include a clear commitment to inclusivity, and the institutions overseeing the election must be empowered to enforce the women’s quota. Government leaders have also arbitrarily managed seats allocated to Somaliland representatives. Given the unique political circumstances, a separate, negotiated, and credible process is required.
Finally, widespread corruption has long tainted Somalia’s selection and election processes, undermining their integrity. In 2022, the presidents of the Federal Member States managed and manipulated the process. To curb corruption in the 2026 improved indirect election model, one effective measure would be to increase the number of voters per seat by aggregating constituencies. In practice, this would mean combined delegates from several constituencies voting together, reducing opportunities for vote buying.
The international community has previously pressured Somali political actors to reach an agreement, insisting there should be “no term extension or unilateral elections by the government” and “no parallel political projects by the opposition”. This approach, combined with the leverage the international community still holds, can be effective. Somalia’s political class must again be pushed into serious, structured negotiations rather than unilateral manoeuvres.
As before, the international community should clearly define political red lines. The government must refrain from any term extensions or unilateral election projects. At the same time, the opposition must abandon plans for a parallel political agenda, including Federal Member States conducting elections outside a political agreement.
Somalis have repeatedly demonstrated their democratic aspirations. What stands in the way is not public will, but elite polarisation and the instrumentalisation of reform for political survival. At this critical moment, the international community cannot afford to retreat into passivity. Proactive and principled engagement is essential to prevent a legitimacy collapse, safeguard the gains of the past 25 years, and protect the substantial investments made in peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia.
